

50X1-HUM

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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COUNTRY Yugoslavia REPORT [redacted]

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1. None of the top Yugoslav leaders seems to be overtly opposed to a normalization of Yugoslav - Soviet relations. However, they approach the subject with varying degrees of caution. There is no appearance of any definite factions on this question. Joza and Marija Vilfan have rather openly expressed themselves for a shift towards normalization. Vladimir Popovic and Koca Popovic also favor a rapprochement, but more cautiously. Mosa Pijade is the most cautious of the party leaders. Aleksandar Rankovic is non-committal, ready to follow Tito's lead.
2. Edvard Kardelj and Aleksandar Rankovic are apparently preparing for a possible ultimate showdown; but it is premature to speak of groups aligning in anticipation of this event. According to Vladimir Dedijer, Rankovic has little personal regard for Kardelj. 50X1-HUM
3. Regarding the role of military leaders in a normalization process, [redacted] the army will probably be most bewildered after years of indoctrination on the threat of Soviet power. The first indications of how far Tito will go with normalization of relations with the USSR, after the meeting with Bulganin, will be reflected in future army indoctrination courses. 50X1-HUM
4. With regard to the position of Pijade, [redacted] his influence is based only on his close connections with Tito. Certain party leaders consider him a doddering old man, ready for retirement; they defer to him only because he can get Tito's ear whenever he chooses. 50X1-HUM
5. [redacted] on Peko Dapcevic, former chief of staff, Koca Popovic and Ivan Gosnjak, [redacted] Dapcevic will be retired to "gilded obscurity," in view of the controversy over his wife, which has not been forgotten in party circles. Rankovic and Kardelj seem to agree on this point. Gosnjak and Koca Popovic seem mutually friendly and cooperative. In a crisis, Tito will rely on Gosnjak's judgment while pretending great interest in Popovic's views. 50X1-HUM

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6. There have been unconfirmed rumors of friction between the top leadership and lower party levels. In the past, both Vladimir Dedijer and Milovan Djilas have stated, low level party functionaries were disgruntled because they were divested of a great deal of their power during the liberalization period. These functionaries are now probably happier about the Yugoslav-Soviet rapprochement than top-level officials, who are worried about how far they can go without becoming isolated from the West.
7. There are no signs, however, of a purge of anti-cominformist elements. If the government were to take such measures, the process would start in the provinces and would be carried out in such a manner as to arouse the minimum of attention.
8. While there is no evidence that there have been any formal exchanges on the party levels with the Soviets, certain Yugoslav leaders, including Vilfan, have admitted that intellectual, academic discussions with the Soviets have taken place.
9. Joza Vilfan, Vladimir Popovic and other officials have recently stressed the need to minimize the military clauses of the Balkan Pact, but they stated at the same time that Yugoslavia had no intention of evading the military clauses.
10. It appears doubtful that the Soviets could succeed in using Tito as a bridge to the Burmese and Indian governments. Nehru and Krishna Menon do not take Tito seriously. Premier U Nu is fascinated by Tito, but openly criticizes Tito's talents and background.
11. [redacted] it is to be expected that most Yugoslav leaders would plant misleading information and half-truths in the West on the rapprochement with the USSR. Tito, however, wishes to consolidate past gains from both East and West. His representatives may therefore plant misleading information in Soviet and Chinese circles as well. Tito is playing an even more dangerous game than in the days following the Soviet-Yugoslav break in 1948. He wants to be all things to all sides and aspires simultaneously to leadership in what he calls the Socialist world. His followers argue that his name commands more prestige than that of Bulganin or Krushchev and is on par with MAO Tse-tung and CHOU En-lai in the Communist World. 50X1-HUM

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